Last night, headlines from all major newspapers enthusiastically announced the victory of Angela Merkel and her party, the CDU, in the German Federal Elections. A few minutes after the first exit polls were released, however, the enthusiasm of journalists and analysts of German politics began to fade. The sister parties CDU/CSU, although remaining in the lead, performed close to their
worst result ever. Their most likely allies, the Liberal Democrats (FDP), performed well, but still not enough to make a solely Black-Yellow coalition majoritarian. With the refusal of the Social Democrats (SPD) to form another Grand Coalition, Merkel is left with a single and very difficult coalition option to negotiate, the Jamaica Coalition (CDU/CSU-FDP-Greens).
If confirmed, this unprecedented coalition will bring together parties with diametrically opposed views. Besides putting environmental concerns on the top of their agenda, the Greens are fervent critics of liberal economic policies and big businesses. They openly criticized the Liberal Democrats during the campaign, leading Christian Lindner, leader of the FDP, to state coalition negotiations depends on the Greens revising their criticism against his party.
On the other hand, environmental issues are not even near to the top of the FDP’s agenda. Although not identified as eurosceptics, the FDP opposes vehemently any attempt to grant more power to EU institutions. That position threatens to undermine the ongoing Franco-German negotiations for EU reform, that would include a common budget and a Finance Minister for the bloc. In the elephant round, traditional debate between the leaders of all major parties following the election, Lindner also suggested his party objects increasing investment in the military which might create obstacles for the Merkel-Macron proposals for an EU collective security framework.
At the moment, no scenario is discarded. In case coalition negotiations fail, a new election, a minority government or a reedition of the Grand Coalition are all possible outcomes. We will only know for sure by the end of the year as negotiations are scheduled to be concluded shortly before Christmas.
The rise of the AfD
Another enduring question of this election is the expressive voting of the right-wing nationalist party Alternative for Germany (AfD). In this election, the AfD became the third major party in German politics. Not only did they win in the state of Saxony but were the second largest party in East Germany only behind Merkel’s CDU.
Polls are conflicting on whether the question of refugees played a role. Earlier polls indicate the issue of refugees was no longer a top priority for German voters. Exit polls released on election day, however, point out that concerns over refugees played a major role in the election. According to a poll commissioned by German broadcaster ARD, 90% of Germans want faster deportations and 71% want to limit the number of migrants entering the country. Also, 57% manifested concern regarding the influence of Islam in Germany, positions associated with the platform of the AfD. Curiously, the voting for the AfD cannot be associated with direct contact with foreigners. While most AfD voters live in East Germany, the majority of immigrants currently live in West Germany.
Concern over refugees, however, does not suffice to explain the surge of the AfD. Analysis of the origins of the AfD voters reveal that the populist party received voters from all over the political spectrum. The AfD won from the CDU alone approximately 1 million voters, followed by half a million from the SPD, and 400.000 from the Left Party. These figures highlight Merkel’s fragility among the more conservative circles of her party. In her current term as chancellor, the coalition with the SDP allowed the chancellor to flirt with the left, opening her right flank to the rise of the AfD. This became evident during the TV-Debate between Merkel and Schulz as the two candidates demonstrated a degree of agreement unlikely to be seen in political adversaries.
So far, the strategy of CDU and SPD is to ignore and isolate the AfD in the German Parliament. This strategy, however, might be precisely what the AfD needs to remain as a major force in German politics. As other populist movements, the AfD capitalized on its role as an outsider. Evidence of that are the almost 1.2 million AfD voters who did not vote in previous elections. Those perceive the AfD as the anti-system party and the isolation of the AfD might reinforce that perception. Perhaps bringing the AfD to the table would be a wiser strategy, but it is also early to tell what tone will the AfD adopt while in Parliament.
What now?
The election campaign was indeed quite boring. The government coming out of it, however, will be anything but boring. Right at the start, Merkel has a very difficult coalition negotiation ahead of her. As she vowed not to work with the AfD, now third major party in the Bundestag, Merkel’s best chance at forming a government is bringing together the antagonistic Greens and Free Democrats. But even if she succeeds at forming the Jamaica coalition, Merkel’s fourth term as chancellor is likely to be filled with compromises and constrained by the disagreements between her junior coalition partners. Any major reform, at domestic or EU level, will become a herculean task and the hoped Franco-German alliance will be constantly put to test.
Far from being gone, the specter of right-wing populism will continue to haunt the European Union. Whether populist parties will return in the next elections is entirely dependent on whether or not Macron and Merkel will succeed in addressing the concerns of these marginalized voters and preserving the economic stability in their respective countries. The necessity to counter the influence of the AfD is likely to lead the new German government more to the right. Stricter policies on refugees and immigrants are likely to be put in place and European integration is likely to experience a new halt or move at a very slow pace. If taken forward, the Macron-Merkel EU reforms will face severe opposition, not only from the AfD, but also from within Merkel’s coalition.
It is certainly not the scenario Merkel expected for her (possible) last term as Chancellor of Germany. She will now fight for her legacy in a very adverse context. We will most likely see a more conservative version of the German chancellor, entrenched in domestic politics and playing a more discreet role in international affairs. It does not mean Germany will be a less relevant actor in world affairs, but the priority now is to restore political stability, prevent fragmentation, and prepare Germany for the next Chancellor.